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1. Introduction 
In the field of risk research, the notion of ’risk governance’ is increasingly used to 
portray synergies created when a multiplicity of actors impact risk decision-
making. While research on risk regulation has for the last 25 years acknowledged 
that relationships between public authorities and private corporations shapes 
regulatory outcomes (e.g. Vogel, 1986) the idea of risk governance has gained 
momentum after the regulatory scandals such as the BSE in the 1990’s, when the 
ability of governments to handle risks on their own and in discretion was ques-
tioned (e.g. Löfstedt, 2005, IRGC, 2009). Risk governance can be conceived as an 
overarching structure in which conventional components of risk analysis; risk 
assessment, risk management and risk communication are embedded in (Renn, 
2008). 
A departure for the study of risk governance has been the risk issue as such; 
once a risk has been identified an elaborate mapping of regulations and govern-
ance actors can commence and subsequently be branded a risk governance regime 
(Hood, Rothstein & Baldwin, 2001, Renn, 2008). An underlying tacit assumption is 
that the inherent character of a particular risk is, or should be, related to what 
governance arrangements unfold. This assumption is problematic. If risks are 
treated as separate entities which harbours their own logic of governance proc-
esses (Renn, 2008), the situated character of risk (Boholm, 2003) is overlooked, 
risks are decontextualized from wider societal structures and risk governance 
regimes tend to be regarded as isolated units. Moreover, by narrowing down risk 
governance to models enabling given or negotiated acceptable risk levels (Renn, 
2008) or by backtracking policy origins and regulatory enforcement (Hood et al, 
2001), well established practices not adhering to formal risk governance policy 
models fail to be acknowledged.  
While risks, ranging from chemicals to natural hazards, interact in complex 
casual relationships (Boholm, M, 2009), little attention has been directed towards 
the interrelationships between risk governance regimes. This report addresses the 
current limitations of risk governance research by presenting a case study of three 
intersecting risk governance regimes existing within a geographically bounded 
area, a river valley.  
Risk governance is according to Gunningham et al (1998) the application of key 
features of governance to decision-making on risk. Theories of governance impli-
cate that the traditional role of the state has been modified through themes such 
as globalisation, deregulation and privatization and has been described as a shift 
from ‘government to governance’ (Rhodes, 1997). Rule by government may be 
thought of as vertical hierarchical authority deriving from a single actor, namely 
the state. In contrast, governance is generally described as horizontal networks 
consisting of multiple actors, including public authorities and private actors, par-
ticipating in formulating public policy (Mört, 2004) hence blurring traditional 
regulatory-regulatee relationships (Sahlin-Andersson, 2004). In governance net-
works, negotiations between actors have been emphasised as central for policy 
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outcomes. Actors, moreover, participate in decision-making on a voluntary basis 
(Webb,2002), which Mört (2004) links to flexible regulatory outcomes that are not 
legally binding, commonly labelled ‘soft-law’ or ‘soft-regulation’(Ahrne& Bruns-
son, 2004).  
The shift from government to governance has, however, been criticised for be-
ing overly simplistic, and it has been argued that additional regulatory modes 
may coexist with a strong state that intervenes through traditional command-and- 
control interventions (e.g. Purvis, 2002, Sorensen and Torfting, 2005). Regulatory 
interventions resembling governance have also been observed in risk regulation. 
For example, Europe in general and Sweden in particular, have been known to 
embrace consensus-style regulation in contrast to adverisal style regulation com-
mon in America (Brickman et al, 1986, Kelman, 1981, Lundqvist, 1981, Löfstedt, 
2005, Vogel, 1985). Consensus-style regulation is notably informal and flexible 
where a limited number of affected parties, including industry representatives 
participate in closed negotiations before a policy is drafted.  Kelman (1981) relates 
the strong Swedish preference for consensus decisions to a historical tradition of 
subordination to elite authority. He further argues that regulatory institutions 
have developed in an ‘accomodationst’ style, thus bringing parties to negotia-
tions, which in turn encourage agreement. Consensus-seeking regulation and a 
tradition of negotiations resemble risk governance, which in it simplest form is 
the interaction between public and private actors in decision-making on risk. 
There are, however, several interpretations of risk governance. Renn (2008 p. 9) 
defines risk governance as “the complex web of actors, rules, conventions, processes 
and mechanisms concerned with how relevant risk information is collected, analysed and 
communicated, and how risk management decisions are taken”. 
Renn (2008) has developed a process-based model to risk governance, which is 
intended to enable regulatory authorities, industry and other affected stake-
holders to optimize risk decision-making and subsequent risk management 
through designated phases or steps that balance and weights risks with regards to 
scientific findings as well as public/societal concerns. The risk governance proc-
ess does according to the model start with a pre-assessment of the risk problem, 
where actors should agree on a common framing of the problem. The next phase 
in the model is the risk appraisal, where the risk is scientifically assessed as well as 
weighted with public concerns. The third phase consists of risk characteriza-
tion/evaluation, where Renn (2008) has developed a risk classification system, 
where risks depending on nine factors adhere to six risk classes. The risk classes, 
named after Greek mythology carries inherent characteristics, which can through 
a traffic light model of risk tolerability, be found as normal, intermediate, intoler-
able or beyond definition risks. The aims of the subsequent risk management phase 
are to, through risk reducing measures such as regulatory intervention or sup-
plementary knowledge, achieve outcomes, which makes the risk tolerable or ac-
ceptable. Risk communication should be an integral component in all phases.  
This risk governance model almost exclusively focus on making risk manage-
rial options available, through processes of deliberation and consultation. Renn’s 
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key argument is that societal concerns need to be addressed as risk management 
decisions, characterized by high levels of uncertainty can only have sound out-
comes if all affected parties have a say in the process.  While Renn (2008) ac-
knowledge that national and institutional cultures, values and traditions influence 
policy processes and outcomes, he yet argues that the model may be applied and 
adapted to most risk governance processes and thus offer greater global risk gov-
ernance coherence. 
If Renn (2008) depicts a normative ideal model of how risk governance ought 
to unfold Hood, Rothstein & Baldwin (2001) have developed an analytical frame-
work based upon systematic empirical analysis of nine risk issues and their regu-
latory framework. They argue that an enhanced understanding of risk regulation 
requires a disaggregate of ‘risk regulatory regimes’ in a two dimensional manner; 
first differentiating between regime context and content, second focusing on the 
interplay and linkages between control components such ‘information-gathering’, 
‘standard-setting’ and ’behaviour- modification’. Hood et al (2001) therefore puts 
equal attention to what information serves as basis for setting risk standards and 
subsequent enforcement. In their analysis a risk regulatory regime is narrowed 
down to items of legislation, where policy processes are backtracked to determine 
what interests or pressures were present when the policy was set.  
An important finding was that decision-making and enforcement components 
are often fragmented over several institutional bodies on different administra-
tional levels; shaped by internal institutional factors as well as external pressures, 
such as business lobbies or media salience. Pressures were, moreover, found to 
impact the control components differently. If, for example, a business lobby could 
not influence standard- setting; compensation could often be found in terms of 
laxer enforcement. Indeed, the majority of the risk regulation regimes studied was 
far from coherent and often characterized by weak linkages between control com-
ponents. Attitudes of the regulators and the organisational culture are further-
more emphasised as an important explanatory component that shapes risk regula-
tory regimes. Regulators may thus even be considered an interest group in its 
own (Hood et al, 2001). Risk regulation also tends to be path-dependent, as 
changes are often implemented incrementally to existing regulatory and institu-
tional frameworks (Hood et al, 2001). These findings suggest that already existing 
regulatory standards coupled with institutional and organizational logics are 
highly influential in the workings of risk governance. 
In this study, I will explore the actual practices of risk governance using theo-
retical perspectives from the governance literature with insights on how different 
factors influence regulation, derived from the literature of risk governance.  
 
 
 
4  Göta Älv River Risk Governance   
 CEFOS Report 2010:1  
2. Aims and outline 
This report aims to analyse risk governance structures and practices by using the 
geographical area of Göta Älv River valley as a point of departure. Three risk 
governance regimes for flooding, landslides and dam failure are an alysed, which 
are conjointly managed by several public and private actors, bounded by complex 
regulatory frameworks as well as the local administrative setting. Regulatory, 
administrational and organizational fragmentation is a key characteristic in Göta 
Älv, as river management is divided between public and private actors whose 
managerial duties are regulated by several different pieces of legislation. Key ac-
tors participate in all three governance regimes, yet operating with different regu-
latory demands and organisational logics. Risk of flood, landslide and dam failure 
are also anticipated to intensify as the area has been singled out as a key matter of 
concern for future climate change, requiring the implementation of climate adap-
tation measures (SOU:2006). As climate change will require a development of risk 
governance, it is pertinent to address current constraints and capacities in existing 
risk governance regimes. By focusing on actors’ roles and regulation in the gov-
ernance of Göta Älv, this study hopes to enhance the understanding of risk gov-
ernance regimes and particularly linkages and interrelationships between re-
gimes. It should be noted that this study is not a comprehensive exploration of 
risk governance practices in the area. This pilot study was undertaken during a 
limited time-period with the aims to identify governance regimes and key actors. 
Themes that emerged during this pilot study are planned to be developed and 
elaborated in further research. 
The report is divided into six parts; a background section outlines the case, 
Göta Älv River Valley, the subsequent section presents the governance actors pre-
sent in the river valley and following part concerns this study’s research method. 
The report’s empirical findings of the flood, landslide and dam governance re-
gimes will then be presented. A result section will follow and a discussion over 
the result in the study will be this reports final part. 
 
 
3. The case: Göta Älv River Valley 
Situated in the south-west of Sweden the Göta Älv River connects Sweden’s larg-
est lake, Vänern, with Scandinavia’s largest port in Göteborg; the second largest 
city in Sweden. During its journey to the sea Göta Älv River runs through a land-
scape of sharp falls, forest and lower lying fields. The access to water has histori-
cally drawn people to localize their homes and activities close to the river and 
shore near locations continue to attract residents. Archaeological artefacts and 
culture heritages are plentiful in the river valley and bear witness to the river’s 
historical importance. The river and its also contain environmental as well as rec-
reational values and is a popular tourist destination. Göta Älv is a crucial trans-
port route that has existed for hundreds of years and serves a primary drinking 
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water supply for 700.000 people. Height differences (44m) between Lake Vänern 
and the sea have been regulated though extensive lock systems and have also 
been harnessed for hydropower. Sweden’s first large hydropower station, Olidan 
was constructed in Göta Älv in 1921 and there are four large hydropower stations 
along the river today (Lindström, 1992). This geographical unit is thus construed 
of layers of meanings, functions, organisations and regulations (which will be 
presented further on), and also carries a number of risk dimensions, that will be 
presented below. 
As Göta Älv is Lake Vänern’s only outlet, flooding has always been occurring 
in the area. Flood risk management is mainly carried out through the controlled 
discharge of dams, regulated by the Vänern Water Decree of 1937. The decree 
lowered water levels on Lake Vänern through an increased discharge to Göta Älv 
(Tranberg, 2001). The regulation of Vänern rendered the occurrence of high water 
levels and hence flooding less frequent, but the construction of large dams also 
created the risk of dam failure. Since several communities are located downstream 
from major hydropower stations, dam failure would have catastrophic conse-
quences. Flood risk management and dam safety are two closely interlinked risks 
in the river valley but the discharge rate to Göta Älv and variations in water levels 
also affect slope stability. Göta Älv is, in addition to being susceptible for flood-
ing, also one of the most landslide frequent regions in Sweden due to its geologi-
cal and topological conditions. Major landslides have occurred in the past, the last 
fatal event occurred in Tuve 1977, when nine people were killed when a block of 
houses was swept away (Alén et al, 2000). It has been suggested that variations in 
the water levels due to the regulation of Vänern brought may have been a con-
tributing factor to slope instability (SOU:2006). 
An overall complexity for risk management of the Göta Älv is that manage-
ment measures can be in conflict, flood defences may, for example overload shore 
stretches and aggravate the risk for landslides and low-lying areas close to the sea 
may be put at risk through flood risk reducing measures upstream. Risk man-
agement of the river valley is hence characterized by complex interactions of risks 
and the significant of each risk must be conjointly agreed upon by a number of 
key actors. 
The water system that constitutes Göta Älv and Lake Vänern has been singled 
out as particularly vulnerable to climate change according to the Swedish Climate 
and Vulnerability Inquiry (SOU:2006). Hydrological models used in the inquiry 
predict increasing precipitation, which is expected to render floods more frequent 
and intense. Flooding is currently a major problem in the area, which was high-
lighted in the flood events of winter 2000/2001 that caused extensive damage and 
disruption in the area. Many areas around Lake Vänern became flooded including 
the city of Arvika, which prompted the most challenging peacetime rescue opera-
tion in Sweden’s modern history. The total cost of the Arvika floods alone is esti-
mated to be 200M Swedish Kr (MSB, 2009). The Swedish Climate and Vulnerabil-
ity Inquiry (SOU: 2006) concluded that climate adaptation measures to reduce the 
likelihood of similar events reoccurring were required immediately. Climate 
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adaption adds an additional level of complexity to Göta Älv and accentuates the 
complex risk interactions the current risk governance regimes have to consider. 
 
 
4. Risk governance actors 
The complexity of intersecting risks is matched by the administrative context of 
Göta Älv where several actors; governmental agencies, local authorities and pri-
vate companies are conjointly managing different aspects of the three risks. In 
contrast to other risk issues often discussed in the risk literature, for example ra-
don, (Hood et al, 2001) boundaries between management, regulation and en-
forcement roles are fuzzy and overlapping. The following section will outline the 
main organisational actors, their roles and responsibilities in relation to the risk 
management of Göta Älv.  
 
Local municipalities  
There are six municipalities situated along the Göta Älv River, from Lake Vänern 
to the sea the river runs through; Vänersborg, Trollhättan, Lilla Edet, Ale, 
Kungälv and Göteborg. After the falls in Lilla Edet, the area is flat and low-lying 
thus making downstream municipalities susceptible for flooding. Municipalities 
are in charge of land-use planning, according to the SFS 1987:10 Planning and 
Construction Act and the contingency service within their geographical area, ac-
cording to the SFS 2003:778 Civil Protection Act.  Therefore, municipalities are 
responsible for preventive measures and preparedness for hazards, such as land-
slides or major events such as dam failure. Potential risks to the municipalities 
functions and the health and wellbeing of their citizens have to be identified, ana-
lyzed and presented in a risk and vulnerability analysis according to SFS 2006:942 
Ordinance of Emergency Preparedness. Land-use plans should, moreover, outline 
major risk related to land use, environmental quality and health aspects. Climate 
adaptation is directly relevant a local context, where the municipalities constitute 
a central actor for the implementation of climate policies and preventive risk 
management. However, the main responsibilities lie on several other public as 
well as private actors. 
 
Vattenfall  
Vattenfall1 is a major international energy company and Europe’s fifth largest 
electricity producer. Vattenfall was created in conjunction with the construction of 
Sweden’s first large hydropower station, Olidan 1909, at the falls of Trollhättan in 
Göta Älv; the Swedish parliament then established Kungliga Vattenfallsstyrelsen 
(The Royal Water Board), which later became Vattenfall (Vattenfall, 2009). The 
company has a key role in the risk governance network since they own the rights 
                                                        
1 Vattenfall’s mother company Vattenfall AB is own by the Swedish Government 
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to use water for electricity production in Göta Älv and flood risk management is 
as previously mentioned contingent on the tapping ratio from Vänern to Göta 
Älv. Furthermore, Vattenfall owns and operates the main four hydropower sta-
tions in the river, which renders dam safety a key concern to the company. Vat-
tenfall was until 1993 also responsible for Göta Älv fairway including the lock 
systems as well as hydropower stations. When the European electricity market 
was deregulated, duties related to the lock systems were delegated to the Swedish 
Maritime Administration. Vattenfall is responsible to fund 80% of the shore ero-
sion protection, which may be explained by the company’s previous commit-
ments to fairway maintenance. 
 
The Swedish Maritime Administration  
The Swedish Maritime Administration (Sjöfartsverket) is a public services com-
pany in charge of fairways and maritime traffic in Sweden. The administration is 
divided into six regional Maritime Traffic Areas of which Vänern’s Maritime Traf-
fic Area including Göta Älv is one. It is foremost the responsibilities to maintain 
accessible and safe fairways that steers the administration with respect to flood, 
landslide and dam risk management. The lock systems, also known as channel 
dams, in Göta Älv are furthermore owned and operated by the Maritime Admini-
stration, which renders dam safety a key concern to the organisation (Maritime 
Administration, 2009). 
 
The County Board 
Sweden is divided into 21 counties, each administrated by a regional County 
Board, that serve as a link between municipalities and the government, parlia-
ment and central authorities, ensuring that national policies are enacted locally. 
The Västra Götaland County Board has a regional coordination responsibility for 
the county and one of the board’s main functions is to supervise and monitor 
functions provided by local municipal authorities, as well as issuing licenses and 
inspecting the compliance of different laws and to monitor performance in vari-
ous regulatory areas. Potential risks to the County Board’s functions and the 
health and wellbeing of their citizens, within their geographical area have to be 
identified, analyzed and presented in a risk and vulnerability analysis according 
to SFS 2006:942 Ordinance of Emergency Preparedness. The County Boards are 
also responsible to coordinate emergency preparedness with local actors, and to 
enable regional crisis management cooperation as well as to compile a regional 
risk and vulnerability analysis (www.regeringen.se). 
 
The Swedish Geotechnical Institute (SGI)  
The Swedish Geotechnical Institute (SGI) is a governmental agency that since the 
1960’s, delivers expert competence regarding landslides and coastal erosion to 
local municipalities and County Administrative Boards. SGI has a special mission 
to monitor slope stability and supervise municipalities and the Västra Götaland 
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County Board in landslide related issues in Göta Älv river valley. The supervision 
consists of reviewing land-use documents and issuing recommendations in stabil-
ity related issues. Monitoring duties include stability assessments as well as 
measuring ground movements, inspections and mapping of slopes and submarine 
topography. Since landslides are frequently occurring in the area and constitute a 
major risk, SGI participate in other forums concerning, for example, flood-
reducing measures (SGI, 2009).  
 
Svenska Kraftnät 
Svenska Kraftnät is a state utility company, established in 1992, that runs and 
administrates the national electrical grid. Svenska Kraftnät has a central role in 
dam safety and is since 1998, the inspection guidance authority for dam safety, 
meaning that Svenska  Kraftnät shall guide and monitor the inspection authority, 
in the case of Göta Älv, the Västra Götaland County Board. The mission includes 
annual reporting to the government on how dam safety issues progress in Swe-
den as well as information coordination and supplying of competence within the 
dam safety field (Svenska Kraftnät, 2007). 
The nested character of the inspection authorities duties outlined above, where 
Svenska Kraftnät is monitoring the County Boards that in turn monitor the mu-
nicipalities, is a typical characteristic of Swedish risk regulation. Authorities are 
therefore often interlocked since their regulatory responsibilities are overlapping.  
 
Vänern­Göta Älv River Council 
River Councils are an important component in the regional network development 
for questions concerning high water flows and dam safety. The Councils corre-
spond to a larger body of water, such as Göta Älv and includes municipalities 
along the river, county boards, and dam owners along with other actors, for ex-
ample the Swedish Road Administration. The main objectives for the River Coun-
cils are to enhance river knowledge and to create contact and cooperation be-
tween different actors. The river councils’ responsibilities vary according to the 
local river’s requirements but the River Safety Inquiry (SOU:1995) proposed the 
following tasks; to evaluate flood planning, to discuss dam safety issues with the 
dam owners and to coordinate emergency preparedness (Elforsk, 2006).  
The departure of this study is the Göta Älv river valley and the associated risk 
governance regimes it harbours and while the governance actors, as we seen, have 
diverging roles, objectives and functions, they are all relate to the Göta Älv River. 
The water that runs in the river has several meanings and functions, depending 
on context and the focus of the actors. The river might be approached as a trans-
port route or electricity generator but it is still a common denominator for all the 
actors involved. Göta Älv is therefore regarded as boundary object that has the 
capacity of ‘bridging social worlds’ (Star & Griesemer, 1989) 
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5. Method 
This study approaches risk governance by focusing on a geographically bounded 
object, Göta Älv River. The river represents complex interactions of systematically 
interconnected risk issues (of which flood, landslide and dam safety are ad-
dressed in this report) under the conditions of regulatory, administrative and or-
ganisational fragmentation. Göta Älv River is a paradigmatic example of multi-
risk regimes and interorganisational risk management.  
This study is explorative in character and the data collected has been derived 
through qualitative research methods using interviews and participant observa-
tion. The main part of the empirical material consists of individual and semi-
structured interviews of key actors in the risk governance regimes. The respon-
dents were contacted after an initial documentary study of Göta Älv, where key 
actors and experts within organisations were identified. The key actors were con-
tacted via phone or mail and the research area and issues of interest were de-
scribed.  In total 14 interviews were carried out between June and August 2009, 
lasting between 1 and 3 hours. Officials from the following organisations were 
interviewed; Ale municipality, Lilla Edet municipality, the SGI (Statens Geotek-
niska Institute), Svenska Kraftnät, the Swedish Maritime Administration 
(Sjöfartsverket), Trollhättan municipality, Vattenfall and Västra Götaland County 
Board (Länsstyrelsen Västra Götaland). The respondents are all key specialists on 
flood risk prevention, landslide alleviation and dam safety within their organisa-
tion. It should be noted that there are only a few officials directly involved in the 
risk management of Göta Älv and most of them have been interviewed in this 
study 
As the respondents are managing different aspects of the river, the same ques-
tions were not posed to all of them. However, the main focus and aspects ad-
dressed during interviews were; the organisations’ formal risk managerial duties 
(in relation to the risks addressed), execution and implementation of preventive 
measures, modes of cooperation with organisation, thoughts on risk managerial 
duties and practices in relation to other parties, such as other organisations and 
the public. 
In addition to interviews, literature consisting of documents and reports were 
analysed to gain a deeper understanding of the administrative and regulatory 
framework, and risk managerial duties. Data also derived from a participant ob-
servation undertaking during a landslide inspection tour arranged in May 2009. 
The landslide tour, arranged by the Maritime Administration is a biannual event 
and is an integral part of SGI’s monitoring of Göta Älv’s shore stretches. On the 
inspection tour erosion protection and related stability issues are inspected from a 
boat. The landslide inspection tour included four officials form SGI, three from 
the Maritime Administration and two from Vattenfall. The inspection was judged 
importance as interaction between key actors and practical execution of the pre-
ventive regimes could be observed.  
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6. Risk governance regimes 
The following section will outline three risk governance regimes in Göta Älv; 
flood risk prevention, landslide alleviation and dam risk management. The mana-
gerial strategies for the three risk issues are diverging but broadly the same actors 
participate in all three regimes, however, with shifting functions and roles. The 
empirical data will be arranged in broad categories; voluntary participation, re-
sponsibility and accountability, and expert management, following salient themes 
in governance theory (Rhodes, 1997, Mört 2004). 
 
Flood risk prevention 
The flood risk management of lake Vänern and Göta Älv does in many ways re-
flect the tension between structural engineering solutions and non-structural hu-
man adjustment solutions often referred to in natural hazards literature (cf. White 
1942/1945).  Water levels in Lake Vänern are regulated through  the Vänern’s 
water decree of 1937 that aimed to reduced flooding around the lake by control-
ling and harnessing the discharge to Göta Älv through hydropower stations. The 
decree of 1937 was designed to accommodate a range of stakeholder: fishers, 
farmers, private landowners, maritime traffic and dam owners. Negotiations pre-
ceding the regulation lasted for twelve years and the decree resulted in a 9,000 
page long document (Tranberg, 2001). The decree granted Vattenfall the right to 
vary the tapping to Göta Älv between the afflux and the lower limit, with a reser-
vation that limits the maximum discharge rate to 1,000m3/s in order to prevent 
erosion and subsequent landslides. If Vattenfall exceeds the afflux or the lower 
limit, they are liable for flood damages that occur along the river. 
The possibility to vary the discharge from the lake Vänern to the Göta Älv 
River is the main flood risk-reducing instrument in the region. If flood situations 
occur around Vänern an increased tapping will lower water levels in the lake. In 
contrast, if lower lying areas below Lilla Edet are threatened by flood risk from 
high sea levels, which slows down the river’s discharge to the sea, tapping may be 
cut back. Although the controlled discharge to Göta Älv has reduced the occur-
rence of high water levels and subsequent flooding it may, however, have en-
couraged settlements and infrastructure development in naturally flood prone 
areas. During the flood events of 2000/2001, it became apparent that the regula-
tion did not protect the area from extreme water levels, which raised concerns 
about the reoccurrence of similar events in a scenario of future climate change. 
The Swedish Climate and Vulnerability Inquiry (SOU: 2006) therefore argued that 
Vänern’s Water Decree had created a false sense of security. Increasing precipita-
tion and higher water levels currently pose great problems in the area and are 
expected to increase in the future, the Climate and Vulnerability Inquiry (SOU: 
2006) therefore suggested two measures to mitigate the flood risk: to increase the 
discharge from lake Vänern to Göta Älv in order to lower Vänern by 10-15 cm and 
to adopt a more restrictive approach to land-use planning. More permanent solu-
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tions to the flood problems are considered necessary and the possibility to build a 
water tunnel from Vänern to the sea has been suggested (SGI, 2006b). 
Voluntary participation  
The most direct climate adaptation measure, the increased tapping ratio, relies 
similarly to the current tapping regime on the voluntary participation of Vatten-
fall. The Inquiry suggested that the Decree of 1937 could still be used if the dis-
charge rate could be maximized within the decree, as it would be very expensive, 
complicated and time-consuming to create a new water decree.  During inter-
views with officials from Vattenfall, it emerged that Vattenfall and the Swedish 
Meteorological and Hydrological Institution (SMHI) had initiated the idea of a 
new tapping regime. The two organisations had calculated potential tapping 
strategies and brought the idea forward to a seminar preceding the Climate and 
Vulnerability inquiry. The suggestion was according to the official (V2) later in-
corporated into the inquiry and Vattenfall required that the new tapping should 
remain within the current water decree.  
As a result of the inquiry the government ordered the County Board to com-
mence negotiations with Vattenfall to see whether an agreement could be reached 
(Västra Götaland County Board, 2008). It should be noted that many diverging 
interest are at stake with a new tapping regime: Vattenfall will lose some of its 
electricity production if the tapping degree is increased, for the Maritime Admini-
stration too low water levels render fairways inaccessible, SGI will foremost be 
concerned about landslides as shore erosion will increase, the County Boards 
must consider all the interest in their county, including environmental values, and 
downstream municipalities will be concerned about flood risks in their area. 
Despite losses of electricity production, (not surprisingly since the suggestion 
had been initiated by the company) Vattenfall agreed to participate in the new 
tapping regime without claiming compensations for their losses (Västra Götaland 
County Board, 2008). Vattenfall’s main reasons were as following: 
 
“We have a great responsibility in Göta Älv/ Vänern, we own the tapping regula-
tion” (V2) 
 
“Vattenfall wants to be a good and responsible part of the society and voluntary co-
operation in the regime was considered the easiest option. If we had chosen not to 
participate, they (public authorities) might formally have ordered us to do so and it 
would have been a longwinded, complicated and bureaucratic process”(VI). 
 
Reflected in the statement is a preference for flexible agreements and a reluctance 
to enter formal procedures that were conceived as overly bureaucratic, thus limit-
ing the actors’ ability to adopt a “practical approach to problems” (M4) (c.f Naess 
et al, 2005). The interviews suggest that informal dialogue between the County 
Board, the Maritime Administration, SGI, SMHI and Vattenfall appeared to have 
played an important role in enabling the voluntary regime. In particular, close 
working relationships between the Maritime Administration and Vattenfall 
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emerge as vital for the new regime to have materialized. The Maritime Admini-
stration is directly affected by changes in water levels as it may change the accu-
racy of the nautical charts (MA1). Preceding the formal agreement between Vat-
tenfall and the County Boards deliberations were held between the Maritime 
Administration and Vattenfall (MA1). An official at the Maritime Administration 
commented on the cooperation:  
 
 “There is a close cooperation in Göta Älv, especially with Vattenfall; if I want 
something I just phone them. We call each other several times a week… We’re de-
pendent on them as they control the tapping and we also have several things in 
common. But it’s also a personal thing; staff from the Maritime Administration 
gets along very well with staff from Vattenfall. The work on the river is easy be-
cause we have projects and interest in common. It could be much more complicated 
and bureaucratic”(MA2) 
 
Even if other actors, such as the municipalities, were left out of the discussions 
preceding the implementation of the new tapping regime, they still preferred in-
formal communication paths, which emerge as an important factor to the success 
of the preventive regime as reflected in the following statement; 
“We cooperate with the County Board and Vattenfall on a voluntary basis. It is infor-
mal communication and personal relations that enables this type of cooperation. You see, 
there are no formal channels through which we can communicate.”(M4) 
The inquiry did, as previously mentioned, also urge municipalities to adopt a 
stricter approach to land-use planning with regards to flood risks. However, ex-
actly what this stricter approach should entail and how it should be implemented 
was unclear for the respondents. In Trollhättan municipality several new devel-
opments are planned to be located in the very close proximity to the river. One 
residential area was even planned to be placed on a low-lying island in the river. 
An official at the municipality expressed concern over the new developments:  
 
“At the same time as the municipality tries to consider climate change, new hous-
ing developments are planned right in the river. I don’t think it’s especially wise to 
build there. Here in our municipality the work concerning risks is spread out over 
several departments so it’s difficult to get “the whole picture”. Information gets lost 
between departments” (M3). 
 
However, other officials (C1, C2) interpreted the location to be safe as water levels 
at that particular place could relatively easy be managed through tapping. Inter-
pretations of what a strict land-use policy should entail seemed to vary consid-
erably from department to department and from authority to authority. Munici-
palities have a strong economical incentive to develop areas in the close proximity 
to the river as waterfront housing is in high demand.  Discussions concerning 
land-use planning and flood prevention therefore often focused upon the cost of 
implementing preventive measures. The respondents often argued that the mu-
nicipalities did not have enough resources to rigorously adapt land-use planning 
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for future climate change. Municipalities believe that they can attract new citizens 
by developing areas close to the river and officials argued that if one municipality 
rejected such plans from a developer, a nearby municipality would accept the 
proposal and people would move there instead. The potential loss of tax revenues 
and an attractive edge to the municipality is therefore in conflict with a more rig-
orous approach to land-use planning. This result supports previous research 
(Granberg & Elander, 2007, Langlais, 2007, Storbjörk, 2007), which indicates that 
voluntary climate adaptation policies fall short of other interests, such as eco-
nomic incentives to attract citizens. 
Responsibility and accountability  
Issues of responsibility and accountability emerged as a common thread through-
out the interviews as the current regulatory framework relating to flood preven-
tion was in general perceived as vague. The legislation that most directly relates 
to responses to natural events, SFS 2003:778 Civil Protection Act, refers to inter-
vention by the rescue services prompted by extraordinary and sudden events. 
However, in large water systems such as Lake Vänern and Göta Älv, flooding is a 
slow event whose onset can be relatively easily predicted. It is foremost the 
County Boards’ responsibility to coordinate preventive measures within the re-
gion and the current legislation was perceived as problematic in that regard:  
 
“It takes around two months for a flood to materialise which means that yes when 
the flood finally hits us we can use the rescue services but before that it’s difficult to 
mobilise them for preventive measures.” (C2)  
 
Support for the implementation of preventive flood measures, such as an in-
creased early tapping, could nevertheless be found in another piece of legislation. 
The SFS 1998:808 Environmental Code allows Vattenfall to exceed the current 
water decree if there is an imminent risk for human lives and property. Officials 
at the County board (C1,C2) stated that they sometimes ask Vattenfall to increase 
the tapping if they consider the flood risk to be high, which they did on occasion 
in 2006/2007. However, this preventive regime encountered problems recently, as 
a court found Vattenfall liable to compensate property owners that had sued the 
company. The court order (Vänersborgs tingsrätt, 2009) concluded that Vattenfall 
had acted correctly according to the Environmental Code, but was nevertheless 
liable to compensate property owners according to Vänern’s Water Decree. An 
official (C1) expressed concerns that this may lead to reluctance from Vattenfall to 
follow the County Board’s recommendations regarding tapping. Officials from 
Vattenfall commented on the court order in the below statements: 
 
“It is not a positive thing when you agree to do something that was regarded as the 
right thing to do and then you have to pay for it. I think that we might have to care-
fully consider doing similar things in the future. It would be better if they (County 
Boards) assumed the entire responsibility in such cases (V1)” 
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“We will not agree to similar measures in the future only if it is very acute and an 
overall more serious situation.” (V2). 
 
However, if the County Board assumes responsibility over the tapping, which 
they may do according to the SFS 2003:778 Civil Protection Act, liability for dam-
ages would fall on them instead. An official (C2) stated that central policies that 
exempted them for economical liability would be desirable. 
Expert Management 
While it has been argued that the new tapping regime may threaten environ-
mental values in the area (Hammarström, Expressen, 2008-03-17), the implementa-
tion of the tentative tapping regime did not meet any objections from the respon-
dents in this study. Respondents contributed the success of the implementation 
partly to the Vänern- Göta Älv River Council, where the issue was discussed be-
fore implemented. As have been noted the River Council consist of representa-
tives from key actors from the region, which all have an extensive knowledge 
within their specific fields. Officials claimed that the actors represented in the 
Council know each other well (MA2, S1, C1,C2) and that there was an extensive 
collective knowledge gathered in the forum (C1). The River Council appears to 
play a major role in the flood risk prevention as the key actors get a chance to 
voice concerns about how potential measures such as the tentative tapping regime 
will affect them and how those effects may be mitigated. This is reflected in the 
statement below: 
 
“There is good dialogue in the River Council. Everyone consulted us and listened to 
our opinions and concerns when the new tapping regime was implemented. We all 
know each other very well and which makes everything easier” (S1). 
 
Issues relating to regulatory constraints and risk trade-offs were according to offi-
cials (C1), often addressed within the Council and solutions to existing problems 
could often be found after discussions and negotiations. An official stated: 
“We interpret and negotiate around the existing regulation… Experience and gut 
feeling play an important role in extreme situations. We don’t have time to analyze 
all the statistics; we just have to act (C2). 
 
As expressed by the official, the collective expertise and experience assembled in 
the Council appears as key to implementation of measures. However, only one of 
the six Göta Älv municipalities, Ale, is represented in the River Council, as a 
County Board official put it: all municipalities couldn’t be there (C1). Information 
emerging from discussions should be forwarded to other municipalities in the 
area, yet a municipal official was not aware that the tentative tapping regime had 
been implemented.  
 
“We have said that we don’t think that it’s possible to tap that much, but we can’t 
influence the tapping grade (M3) 
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In another municipality, similarly not represented, in the River Council, located in 
a particular vulnerable low-lying location a more accommodationist approach 
was voiced;  
 
“We have problems with our location; we’re in between the sea and lake 
Vänern…but we can’t resist the tapping regime too much, we must see the whole 
picture, of course there’s a flood risk here but compared to what? It’s worse up-
stream”.(M4) 
 
It should moreover be noticed that in addition to the municipalities, the public is 
also excluded from the decision making process. This is a typical characteristic of 
the Swedish regulatory process, which largely relies on expert management 
(Löfstedt, 2005). The negotiations preceding the new tapping agreement were 
informal and characterized by a few, selected parties, reaching agreement, (Kel-
man, 1981, Lundqvist, 1980). The respondents did, moreover, express a preference 
towards flexible types of solutions over bureaucratic formal ones, which can fur-
thermore explain their willingness to accept regulatory policies formed by a few 
actors.  
In the tapping regime, Vattenfall appeared as a key player, at the same time 
initiating and enabling the new flood preventive measure. However, consulta-
tions with other central stakeholders such as the Maritime Administration and 
SGI were necessary in order for the preventive measure to materialise. The 
County Board emerge in this regime as a facilitator and negotiator between stake-
holders. The municipalities did not play a prominent role in decision-making pre-
ceding the tapping regime but did instead have a main role in decision-making 
regarding land-use planning. As we will see in the landslide prevention case, the 
implementation of the new tapping regime partly triggered a new mission for 
SGI.  
 
Landslide prevention 
Climate change is expected to aggravate slope stability in the Göta Älv River val-
ley as wetter winters and drier summers are anticipated to bring larger fluctua-
tions of groundwater levels as well as increasing shore erosion. The Climate and 
Vulnerability Inquiry (SOU:2006) concluded that supplementary knowledge of 
slope stability was essential for further climate adaptation. SGI has therefore been 
commissioned to extend their current mission with additional landslide assess-
ments in the Göta Älv river valley. The new mission started in spring 2009 and 
will be carried out over three years. While stretches of the river area were ana-
lysed and mapped during the 1960’s, many areas remain uninvestigated, for ex-
ample the submarine terrain of the river. Land-use has changed in the region dur-
ing the last forty years, which may have affected stability. The new mission is also 
related to the tentative tapping regime, as an increased discharge to Göta Älv will 
increase erosion in the channel.   
16  Göta Älv River Risk Governance   
 CEFOS Report 2010:1  
Landslides are, however, a familiar phenomena in the region with several 
landslides occuring annually, although the majority remain small and shallow 
(SGI, 2006a). Historically, several major landslides have occurred in the river val-
ley, the first documented one as early as 1150. The most severe landslide occurred 
at Intagan in 1648 and led to the death of 85 people (SGI, 2006a). In recent history, 
three major landslides have occurred: Surte in 1950, killed two people and led to 
extensive damage, Göte in 1957, killed three people and the destruction of many 
houses and the previously mentioned landslide of Tuve in1977, when a whole 
block of houses was swept away, killing nine people (Alén et al,2000). Landslides 
have shown to be catastrophic in the past and preventive measures are vital to 
mitigate potential consequences. According to estimates it is also cheaper to pre-
vent even small landslides than to pay recovery costs from such events (SOU: 
2007). 
Voluntary participation  
Similarly to the flood risk prevention regime, landslide alleviation in the context 
of Göta Älv is largely contingent on actors’ voluntary participation; however this 
regime lacks the inclusion of Vattenfall. Land-use planning carried out by local 
municipalities, is the most effective way to prevent landslides. To assist the mu-
nicipalities’ work SGI can review the land-use plans according to their specific 
Göta Älv mission. The reviewing service is, however voluntary, as it the munici-
palities’ responsibility to initiate contact with SGI is. Out of the municipalities 
participating in this study, Lilla Edet and Ale regularly consult SGI in their plan-
ning processes (M1, M2, M4). Moreover, if the municipalities chose to get a review 
from SGI, it is voluntary to follow their stability recommendations. An official 
from SGI described the relationship with the municipalities in the following way: 
 
“It works well most of the time, but of course some municipalities are more active 
than others. They also follow our recommendations most of the time but problems 
occur when there is already something established on an existing site.” (S1) 
 
It also became apparent that an informal engagement served as an important 
component of the landslide prevention regime. When the Maritime Administra-
tion’s pilots drive up and down the river, they simultaneously observe the shores 
and river for changes that indicate that a landslide has occurred. If changes are 
observed, an official at the SGI is contacted, and may visit the site if observations 
indicate something serious. The landslide observation mission was according to 
officials (MA1, MA2) introduced by a former manager and is now incorporated 
into the preventive regime in the river valley. Officials considered the constant 
surveillance of the river as an important component in the landslide prevention 
regime (SI, C2). This example further supports the importance of key individuals 
in preventive regimes (c.f Gustavsson et al, 2009; Neuval & van der Brink, 2009). 
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Responsibility and accountability 
During the study, issues of responsibility and accountability were salient within 
the landslide prevention regime. In particular, boundaries between the munici-
palities’ and the private property owners’ responsibility were recognized as prob-
lematic (S1, C2, M4, M1). As previously noted by an SGI official, problems arise 
when an area that is already developed is recommended to undergo further sta-
bility analysis by SGI. A stability analysis is estimated to a minimum of 100. 000 
Swedish Kr and should be funded by the property owner as they are responsible 
for the property. If the analysis concludes that further stability measures are re-
quired, governmental funds are available to perform those measures. Getting the 
initial stability analysis carried out appeared to be the biggest obstacle in the land-
slide prevention regime, as clarified by an official: 
 
“The technical expertise within landslides and landfall exists. We know where a 
landslide might occur and what measures we could take to ensure stability, the dif-
ficult part is to decide who’s responsible for what and who’s going to pay it”. (S1).  
 
The absence of clear national policies stating how the municipalities should act in 
preventive stability measures was perceived as problematic and the ‘grey zones’ 
left the municipalities to interpret issues of responsibility. For example, Lilla Edet 
and Ale, two neighbouring municipalities, had interpreted their responsibility in 
regards to landslide prevention differently. In Lilla Edet, the property owner (for 
private properties not industrial ones) only have to pay 10% of the initial analysis, 
as the municipality funds 10% and the rest is made available through government 
funds. In the neighbour municipality of Ale, a different policy has been designed 
where the property owner has to fund the whole cost for the initial analysis. It 
should be noted that none of the interpretations are wrong but rather depend on 
which piece of legislation the municipality emphasized and how they interpret 
issues of responsibility regarding stability.  
Nevertheless, the two municipalities faced similar problems when encounter-
ing sites characterised by multi-ownership and where the property owners were 
reluctant to fund a stability analysis. However, in Lilla Edet, the problem was 
only encountered at industrial sites. Multi-ownership sites posed problems as 
several property owners first have to agree that a stability analysis was necessary 
despite the high costs involved and second, divide the expenses between them. 
Public authorities cannot order a property owner to undertake preventive meas-
ures, which means that stability measures sometimes end at the very first stage of 
the preventive regimes. If the situation is acute the rescue services may evacuate 
the site but this was, according to the interviewees, extremely rare (S1, C2, C3). 
The different preventive strategies prevailing in the area could in the long term 
aggravate stability (S1). Solving stability issues are according to officials at SGI 
mostly about resources and political will. Reflected in the interviews was the be-
lief that landslide alleviation needed more central resources and national direc-
tives:  
18  Göta Älv River Risk Governance   
 CEFOS Report 2010:1  
 
“The political will must come from a higher level than the municipalities. It must be 
considered to be of great importance for the society (S1)”. 
 
The official at SGI was concerned that landslide alleviation is considered costly 
and difficult to manage by local and regional authorities. Landslide mitigation is 
invisible, in contrast to flood prevention where embankments are salient and may 
contribute to a feeling of safety. This could contribute to flood risk measures being 
prioritized more than landslide alleviation (S1). 
Information 
The landslide prevention regime does to a large extent rely on the outcomes of 
dialogue with the property owners, which is often undertaken conjointly by offi-
cials from SGI and the municipalities. The municipalities did in general perceive 
their duties to inform citizens about stability issues as highly problematic. In par-
ticular, officials were concerned that information would unnecessarily worry the 
citizens without offering any means to mitigate the problem. None of the munici-
palities did actively inform about landslides, mainly because they did not know 
how much, and what kind information they should provide not to worry citizens. 
Information regarding stability issues could negatively affect property value, as 
clarified by an official in the statement below; 
 
“If we for example let someone know that their area should undergo a stability 
analysis or that there could be a problem, we might lower the value of the property. 
We therefore chose to inform on a case-by-case basis, as each case is unique” (M2). 
 
Despite Göta Älv River valley’s long history of landslides the officials perceived 
the property owners’ landslide awareness to be low and stability issues were in 
general not prioritised:  
 
“I think stability is a low priority when it comes to buying a house, I mean you in-
spect the roof, makes sure that the area is nice but you don’t inspect the actual 
ground that the house is built on, do you? “ ( M1) 
 
“The property owners don’t think the issue is especially important and don’t really 
want to know…they look at the neighbourhood and the house itself when they buy a 
house, not the stability.” (M4) 
 
The low awareness was, by the officials, perceived to be related to divisions of 
responsibility, as the public in general believed that the government was respon-
sible for stability issues. Despite the lack of clear national policies, an official from 
SGI, had noted that governmental authorities often thought that municipalities 
were more active in stability issues (S1). Research has shown that different organi-
sations and institutions understand and perceive risks in diverse ways (e.g. Hut-
ter, 2001, Turner and Pidgeon, 1997, Weir, 1996), since over time beliefs and per-
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spectives develop as a result of particular organisational settings. Organisational 
boundaries can therefore impede communication between different actors, which 
is why fragmented risk management regimes are often put forward as a contribu-
tor to disaster (Hutter, 2001;2005, Turner and Pidgeon, 1997, Weir, 1996). 
Expert Management 
SGI has an unchallenged national expertise within stability issues and the man-
agement of expertise characterizes the landslide alleviation regime in Göta Älv. 
SGI’s recommendations are seldom challenged because of their validity, as high-
lighted in a statement from a municipal official: 
 
“Half of our land-use planning costs are to stability investigations; we have a close 
relationship with SGI. They look at our plans, and we have full respect for SGI 
(M4). 
 
An important part of SGI’s expert knowledge derives from practical experience in 
the river valley, as the ability to evaluate a slope derives from capacity to observe 
changes and relate them to previous experiences and events. SGI has also a well-
established presence in the different risk governance regimes. For example, the 
annual landslide inspection tour provides continuity in their work as well as es-
tablishing and maintaining contact with other important actors in the regime. 
During the landslide inspection tour officials at SGI were left to monitor the 
shorelines without any involvement from members of staff from Vattenfall and 
the Maritime Administration, and recommendations from SGI were in general 
accepted and implemented. A senior member of SGI had participated in the land-
slide tours for over ten years, gradually introducing other members of staff from 
the SGI. The landslide inspection tour may be viewed as a forum for establishing 
contact and cooperation, which may be regarded as as important as the actual 
inspection in the landslide prevention regime. An official at SGI highlighted the 
importance of cooperation with other actors: 
 
“A major part of our work is to create channels for communication and dialogue so 
that the involved parties know the issue and background well.” (S1) 
 
In addition to the landslide inspection tour, the River Council also functions as a 
network for cooperation as mentioned in the flood case. Similar to the flood pre-
vention regime, stability related issues could often be solved since the representa-
tives knew each other so well. An official from the County Board stated that an 
earlier issue regarding funding for landslide mapping could be solved because 
“we understand each others situation and negotiations regarding costs were greatly facili-
tated by that (CB2).”  
The role of the stability expert, SGI, is very prominent in the Göta Älv river 
valley as they are consulted regularly by the County Boards. It should however be 
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noted that the SGI is an agency with limited power, which may not enforce rec-
ommendations. 
It is relevant to note that SGI’s new mission was closely linked to the imple-
mentation of other climate adaptation measures in the area, such as the tapping 
regime. Knowledge of slope stability can thus be seen as prerequisite to other risk 
governance regimes. In the landslide prevention regime, the municipalities 
played a very prominent role as they could create their own policies for preven-
tive measures. SGI appeared as a major expert, consulting and supporting the 
municipalities when approaching private property owners. The Maritime Ad-
ministration through its continuous shore observation emerges as an important 
component to safeguard the river, even if this practice is not aligned with formal 
divisions of duties and responsibility. As we will soon discover the Maritime 
Administration participate in the dam risk governance regime but will assume a 
different role. 
 
Dam Risk Management 
Water regulation in Sweden is essentially carried out through hydropower sys-
tems and 50% of Sweden’s total energy derives from hydropower. In Göta Älv 
there are four large hydropower dams (generating 1.5TWh) and six lock systems 
(channel dams), along with many smaller types of water reservoirs. As previously 
noted, by using dams to regulate water systems, the flood risk is to a certain ex-
tent mitigated but instead replaced by the risk of dam failure. There are a few 
dam failures with severe consequences every year internationally. Sweden has 
been spared from major dam failures, however, a few minor ones have occurred, 
notably, Noppikoski in 1985, Sysslebäck in 1973, and Aitik in 2000, a mining dam. 
At Sysslebäck, the failure led to one death besides extensive damage to roads and 
buildings. In Noppisko, the Hansjö power station was damaged along with roads, 
bridges and woodlands (Elforsk,2006). A main problem associated with dam risk 
management is that dams were constructed a long time ago, thus rendering it 
difficult to know what floods they have been dimensioned for and how material 
has been affected many years later (Berntsson, 2001). Dam safety has been high-
lighted as an important issue with regards to future climate change as increasing 
water levels in rivers and lakes affect dams and other water reservoirs (Svenska 
Kraftnät, 2001, SOU:2007, the Swedish National Audit Society , 2007). 
Dams are regulated mainly through the SFS 1998:808 Environmental Code, 
which stipulates that the dam owner must take preventive measures to ensure 
that human health or the environment is not compromised. The dam owner is, 
moreover, strictly liable for any damage caused in the event of a dam failure. The 
legislation is based upon a system of self-regulation where the dam owner is re-
sponsible to develop a functioning system of preventive measures, which is then 
inspected by the County Board. The hydropower systems and certain lock sys-
tems in Göta Älv have been classified as hazardous facilities and are therefore 
subject to the SFS 2003:778 Civil Protection Act, which stipulates that facility own-
ers have to provide emergency preparedness that could include certain material 
  Göta Älv River Risk Governance  21 
 CEFOS Report 2010:1  
or staff as well as a risk analysis. The municipalities are responsible to inspect the 
compliance of the SFS 2003:778 Civil Protection Act. 
Voluntary participation  
In contrast to the flood and landslide prevention regimes, a strict regulatory 
framework bounds the dam regime. However, the Environmental Code does not 
offer any guidance on what preventive measures are required to ensure sound 
dam safety. This gap between hard standard and practical execution has been 
filled with guidelines issued by the hydropower industry that offers a system of 
preventive measures. The guidelines, RIDAS, were developed and ratified in 1997 
by Swedenergy, the hydropower companies’ branch organization. RIDAS pro-
vides definitions for dam safety assessment and aims to provide the dam owners 
with systematic system of self-regulation (RIDAS, 2004). The voluntary compo-
nent of dam risk management consists of the adaptation of RIDAS, which has 
evolved as the principle prevention tool for dam safety in Sweden (Berntsson, 
2001). Certain key features of RIDAS, the comprehensive dam review and conse-
quence classification on dams, have been judged so valuable by Svenska Kraftnät 
that they have been integrated into the County Boards monitoring and inspection 
of the dam owners’ system of self-regulation (Svenska Kraftnät, 2007). 
The voluntary guidelines were put forward as a major improvement in Swed-
ish dam safety as RIDAS provide a more coherent and systematic approach to 
dam risk management across member organizations especially to companies that 
had not previously focused so closely on dam safety issues. (SV2). This appeared 
to be validated in the local context of Göta Älv, as officials highlighted the impor-
tance of sound structures for inspections and reviews (MA1, MA2). Whilst RIDAS 
is considered an important tool in the dam risk governance regime, Vattenfall has 
in-house dam risk management systems far more extensive than RIDAS (Bernts-
son, 2001) as the voluntary guidelines only include “ half of the things a dam owner 
have to do and big changes have occurred within the international dam safety field (V1)”. 
Preventive dam risk management is thus contingent of the dam companies’ vol-
untary participation, which has been acknowledged by a report from the Swedish 
National Audit Society (2007).  
Responsibility and accountability  
The Swedish system of dam safety depends not only on the dam industry’s volun-
tary participation but also on the inspection authorities’ capacity to inspect and 
monitor the dam owners’ system of self-regulation. This has been addressed as a 
limitation to the current dam safety system in Sweden by the Swedish National 
Audit Society (2007), which argued that the current legislation in the area could be 
misinterpreted by the inspection authorities. The inspection duties of dams are 
regulated by two pieces of legislation that in some regards overlap, County 
Boards are inspecting dams according to the SFS 1998:808 Environmental Code, 
and municipalities inspect hazardous facilities, which most large dams have been 
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classified as, according to the SFS 2003:778 Civil Protection Act. Officials at Sven-
ska Kraftnät described the problem in the following terms: 
 
“A clear direction in the dam safety area may be missing. We therefore aim to clar-
ify certain principles within the area. As it is now, dam owners as well as inspec-
tion authorities may misinterpret the legislation. There is an ambiguity about the 
division of roles and responsibility … A closer cooperation between different actors 
is required to solve these issues. (SK2). “ 
 
In the Göta Älv River, the division of responsibility between the inspection au-
thorities, the County Board and the municipalities, was not perceived as problem-
atic as the actors had interpreted dam inspection duties to be the sole responsibil-
ity of the County Board (C2, C3, M3, M4). A municipality official did, however, 
express concerns for dam safety issues as he stated: 
 
”I think dam safety was out of focus for some time after the deregulation, they are 
just power companies wanting to sell electricity…if we see an error we contact Vat-
tenfall, but we don’t if we spot deficiencies in their dam safety” (M3) 
 
Dam safety is not only contingent of the dam owner’s ability to maintain and pre-
vent dam failure, but does in addition also rely on land-use in the proximity of 
dams. This has been an issue often neglected by planners and other officials, 
which have been argued to overestimate dams’ flood mitigating capacities and 
therefore construct on land in the proximity to dams (Svenska Kraftnät, 2001). 
This problem was accentuated in the aftermaths of the 2000/2001 floods when 
local authorities were criticised for not keeping natural riverbeds open. Svenska 
Krafnät (2001) argued that dam safety in the future, especially with regards to 
climate change, could be compromised if land-use plans fail to consider the need 
for discharge to be released. Officials at Svenska Kraftnät argued that appropriate 
land-use planning is a societal responsibility, and a dam owner could hardly be 
held responsible if housing is put in places known to flood (SK2). 
Information  
In contrast to other high-risk systems, such as nuclear power stations or petro-
chemical facilities, there are no warning systems for people living in the close 
proximity of a large dam. While officials in general thought that people living 
close understood that a failure would have devastating consequences, no informa-
tion on potential action or evacuation procedures are actively distributed to the 
public. 
 
“It is difficult to inform people about dam safety correctly…yes, potentially a dam 
failure would have huge consequences but we must at the same time inform them 
about the safety work that we do (V1)”. 
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Risks, including dam failure, should be outlined in land-use documents according 
to the SFS 1987:10 Planning and Construction Act, as well as emergency prepar-
edness plans according to the SFS 2003: 778 Civil Protection Act. However, in 
Trollhättan municipality, the emergency preparedness plan containing informa-
tion on how to act in the event of a dam failure, had after careful considerations 
not been made public on the municipality’s website, since it was believed that 
information of a potential dam failure would scare people (M3). In addition, the 
potential use of such information would according to officials be limited since if a 
dam of Trollhättan would fail there ‘would be little time to save anything’ (M3).  
However, the general public was (by the officials) understood to have a low 
awareness of risks associated with dams. Officials ascribed that to historical rea-
sons. Dams and the electricity they produced were a prerequisite for Sweden’s 
industrialisation, and have hence existed for hundreds of years constituting a fa-
miliar element within the local environment.  
Expert management  
Dam risk management in Sweden is highly characterized by expert management, 
which was reflected in the risk governance regime of Göta Älv. Dam safety devel-
opments have largely been carried out by the dam industry alone and competence 
within the dam safety field is unmatched by public authorities. These two factors 
have been pointed out as deficient in the Swedish system of dam safety (Svenska 
Kraftnät, 2008, National Audit Society, 2007). An official perceived this as prob-
lematic at a national level: 
 
“A strong societal function that is qualified to meet the dam industry would be 
highly desirable. Currently the dam industry does not perceive it valuable to dis-
cuss things with county boards and municipalities since they are a great deal more 
competent than the public authorities. The dam industry has to explain different 
terms and concepts, which is not so constructive for them to do. (SV1)” 
 
The local context in Göta Älv in many ways, reflects the national situation where 
Vattenfall competence (claiming to be world leading within the dam safety field, 
V1) is unmatched by the inspection authorities. 
 
“The inspection authority does in general have difficulties understanding the dam 
safety issue and related information…there is no one to ask about dam safety issues, 
even internationally it is difficult. “ (VI). 
 
The Maritime Administration expressed similar viewpoints:  
 
“We send them (the County Board) annual reports but not for all our dams. It’s dif-
ficult to know what we should send them. For example, if we send them the reports 
for the extended dam inspection, will they read them? The contingency services in-
spect our fire extinguisher at the lock but never inspect the lock system, that’s sort 
of where the benchmark is. The county boards are not so active. You trust the other 
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actors to be honest and to do their work; I think that is typically Swedish don’t 
you?”(M2) 
 
Officials at the County Board admitted that they could not verify the dam owners’ 
technical competence (C2, C3), as reflected in the statement below:  
 
“Dam inspection is mostly a resource issue. There are around 2,000 dams in our 
county alone and we don’t really have the technical competence that would be re-
quired for sound inspections. I don’t think dam safety is an especially prioritised is-
sue. There are experts that we may hire but it’s expensive and not a cost that most 
county boards can afford. “(C2) 
 
Meanwhile, officials argued that they were only supposed to review the dam 
owners’ system of self-regulation, which had been found highly satisfactory 
within Vattenfall as well as the Maritime Administration. The historical ties be-
tween Vattenfall and the Maritime Administration along with the specific climate 
for dam safety have enabled an extraordinary cooperation between the two or-
ganisations. Whilst, other actors, such as the County Board, are involved in tap-
ping regimes and issues relating to flood and landslide risk management, dam 
safety is principally an issue dealt with by the two organisations alone. 
Vattenfall and the Maritime Administration have as previously mentioned his-
torical ties to each other, and did on the landslide inspection tour, called them-
selves “the two owners of Göta Älv”.  Since lock systems and dams are often inter-
connected, the two actors often carry out dam safety measures conjointly. In addi-
tion to these joint systems, an emergency preparedness plan for dam failure is 
currently being formulated by the two organisations. During the landslide inspec-
tion tour the members of staff from Vattenfall and the Maritime Administration 
appeared to know each other very well and referred to dams as Göran’s dam or 
Bengt’s dam. Respondents also frequently mentioned that the two organisations 
used to be “one” and “glued together”. For example, when major dam upgrading 
was carried out in Göta Älv, two members from Vattenfall and the Maritime Ad-
ministration decided what dams to prioritize and negotiated costs associated with 
that. An official from the Maritime Administration explained:  
 
“We trust Vattenfall; they are somewhat public and have a moral or a status that 
means that they are not only after profits. It works well but if a foreign company 
bought Vattenfall every decision would have to be settled in the Environmental 
Court. We get along fine, but what if we didn’t? “(MA2) 
 
The relationship between Vattenfall and the Maritime Administration shaping the 
dam risk governance regime can be viewed as an outcome of Swedish consensus-
style regulation. Löfstedt (1996; 2005) has previously observed similar close work-
ing relationships between key actors in other Swedish regulatory areas such as 
nuclear energy and chemical regulation. He found that the limited range of regu-
latory actors enabled these kinds of close personal working relationships. Private 
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as well as public actors in Sweden often enjoy high levels of public trust, which 
Löfstedt (2005) argues is a prerequisite for this particular style of regulation.   
Experience 
Dam risk management is characterised by expertise through experience (Hart-
ford& Baecher, 2004). The importance of practical experience rather than theoreti-
cal knowledge was highlighted during interviews. When the Maritime Admini-
stration hires consultants from Vattenfall, they often picked older members of 
staff that have more experience. The main rational being that the consultants have 
to be able to observe deficiencies and at the same time suggest measures to re-
solve them (MA2).  Although Vattenfall has adopted a formal and standardised 
risk-based approach to dam safety, it was still emphasised that changes had to be 
implemented incrementally based upon practical knowledge on how the dams 
function today. Experience and intuition were judged as equally or more favour-
able by officials:  
 
“You can’t calculate everything theoretically it just doesn’t work” (MA2) 
 
“I mean risk analysis have existed for a long time but in different shapes, for exam-
ple when the flows were high in Dalslandskanal a retired old man went out and 
stood on the dam to feel how it rattled, and after that he was determined that the 
dam was able to withstand those flow levels. His father had worked with that dam 
all his life and there was a nail in the mountain on the other side that marked the 
highest water level. The combination of the nail and the old man constituted a risk 
analysis.”(CB2)  
 
The example above demonstrates that an understanding of knowledge is acquired 
through practice, consisting of clues, such as the nail combined with ‘sensory ex-
periences’ (Gherardi&Nicolini, 2002) such as the feeling of a dam. These compe-
tencies cannot be described or simply communicated; rather they must be prac-
ticed in order to materialise (Gherardi&Nicolini, 2002). 
In the Göta Älv risk governance of dams, Vattenfall has an expert role which 
through a long history of cooperation, also has spilled over on the Maritime Ad-
ministration. Since their expertise is left unmatched by public authorities such as 
the County Board and the municipalities, the two dam owners could largely de-
termine the direction for the managerial strategies. The municipalities were not 
present in this regime and the County Board only played a minor role.  
 
 
7. Discussion 
The fragmented risk governance regimes in the Göta Älv river valley did in large 
part succeed to carry out preventive measures despite the diverse objectives the 
actors represent and the different regulatory complexities. If we apply Hood et 
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al’s (2001) control system components to the risk governance regimes of Göta Älv, 
we find that boundaries between enforcement and regulated parties are often 
fuzzy and overlapping. Formal duties are furthermore often not consistent with 
practical execution. However, even if control components are fragmented the 
linkages between them cannot be considered weak as informal practices fill gaps 
and interlink administrative fragmentation. 
Key to the working of the fragmented regimes thus emerge as flexible and vol-
untary agreements within a coherent group of actors with close working relation-
ships. The core actors consisting of experts from Vattenfall, the County Board, the 
Maritime Administration and SGI, can be seen, as an enduring governance net-
work stretching over the geographical unit of Göta Älv, comprised of actors par-
ticipating in multiple risk governance regimes although assuming different func-
tions in each regime. This was demonstrated by the example of the Maritime Ad-
ministration, which appears as a crucial stakeholder in the flood risk regime, hav-
ing an informal monitoring role in the landslide regime and an expert role within 
the dam safety regime.  
In the case of Göta Älv the application of an ideal risk governance model 
(Renn, 2008), which through designated phases leads to risk decision-making is 
unrealistic. We found, for example, in the implementation of the tapping regime, 
that risk decision-making is clearly delimited by existing regulations like the 
Vänern Water Decree of 1937 and organisational requirements, such as the neces-
sity to maintain the navigability of nautical charts. Certain criteria thus bound the 
scope of negotiations from the off-set (Boholm,2009a). To recommend the inclu-
sion of certain governance actors or stakeholders (Renn, 2008) for risk decision 
making also appear as problematic. The governance network in Göta Älv had 
been formed over a long period of time based on interdependencies evolving into 
close workings relationships.  
Networks stretching over several organisations may be viewed as a ‘communi-
ties of practice’ (Wegner, 1998, Wegner et al, 2002). Participants that actively en-
gage in an activity, eventually evolves in a certain type of practice that enables 
social learning. An important component in a community of practice is processes 
of collective negotiations, where participants conjointly negotiate understandings 
of their particular situation. Through negotiations accountability is also divided 
between the participants Wegner, 1998).  The governance network of Göta Älv 
may be perceived as a community of practice that continuously negotiate under-
standings of risk issues whilst carefully considering each other’s expertise, facili-
tated by consensus seeking traditions. Themes that emerged in the risk govern-
ance regimes will be discussed in the following section. 
 
Voluntary participation  
The prevalence of voluntary participation in the risk governance regimes, often at 
the initial level of implementation of the preventive measures appeared in all 
three regimes. Governance networks are often characterised by voluntary partici-
pation (Mört, 2004), which in the case of Göta Älv rendered the regimes flexible, 
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and can be perceived as a crucial characteristic of fragmented risk management 
where different actors must be given room to adjust their particular objectives to 
the ‘overall plan’. The reluctance to introduce a new water decree in the tapping 
regime is concurrent with is Hood et al’s (2001) findings, which demonstrated that 
regulatory regimes tend to be path dependent and that changes are introduced 
incrementally. 
Regulatory outcomes of governance has been noted to often result in ‘soft-law’, 
this was particularly notable in the dam safety regime. The dam industry fills the 
gap between the hard-law objective and practical implementation with specific 
yet flexible guidelines. RIDAS function as a compliment to a non-specific hard-
law, following Brunsson and Jacobsson’s (2000) discussion of different regulatory 
modes. Interestingly, certain features of RIDAS have also been incorporated into 
the inspection authorities monitoring of the dam owners, thus clearly blurring 
regulator-regulatee relationships (Sahlin-Andersson, 2004). 
The most striking example of voluntary participation was, however, the Mari-
time Administration’s continuous shore observation, which was not recorded in 
any formal documentation. Yet during the interviews it became apparent that this 
informal commitment was an integral part of the landslide prevention regime.  
 
Responsibility and accountability 
Interpretations of responsibility and accountability emerge as a strong theme in 
all the regimes, often as a result of vague and ambiguous regulatory frameworks 
that research has found to be a general characteristic of climate adaptation (c.f. 
Naess et al, 2005). None of the regimes had clear instructions on how to imple-
ment preventive measures based on existing regulation. While some cases were 
clearly hampered by the lack of guidance others appeared to benefit of flexible 
interpretations. 
The division of responsibility is particularly accentuated in the landslide pre-
vention case. Similar to the other cases, there are notably no clear national policies 
stating how the municipalities should act in stability issues, which has led to dif-
ferent interpretations of the municipalities’ responsibility. Unclear distribution of 
roles and responsibility has been found to be a key obstacle to the implementation 
of preventive measures (Naess et al, 2005, Neuval & van der Brink, 2009, 
Storbjörck, 2007), which the problems associated with the initial stability analysis 
clearly demonstrates. 
In Göta Älv, dam safety inspection is the sole responsibility of the County 
Boards, even if the municipalities are also formally responsible for the inspection 
of dams classified as hazardous facilities. In a community of practice, actors nego-
tiate boundaries of accountability and informal responsibility may therefore differ 
from those formally stated (Wegner, 1998). The division of inspection responsibili-
ties between the municipalities and the County Board may be perceived in this 
way; the County Board taking the main responsibility and the municipalities 
knows that the dams are inspected, which is what matters in practice.  
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Information 
In the landslide and dam preventive regimes officials find it difficult to inform the 
public about the risk issues. This may be understood if using Suchman (2000) con-
cept ‘orders of stabilisations’ that refer to different understandings of an issue. 
Using the case of bridge building she demonstrates that expert engineers’ sense-
making emerge in a professional setting where understandings of technical arte-
facts and organisational functions are communally negotiated and agreed upon. 
In contrast, residents developed an understanding of bridge building comprised 
of familiar artefacts and points of references in their daily lives. The experts and 
the residents ‘orders of stabilisation’ were hence not aligned as experts negotiated 
an understanding of the issue from their professional sphere which differed from 
residents who placed bridge building within their domestic sphere. The concept 
of ‘order of stabilisation’ can be applied upon the landslide and dam cases where 
officials from authorities and property owners feared that public perceptions of 
the risks would differ remarkably from the official view thus rendering communi-
cation problematic. This became salient in the landslide case where officials and 
property owners understanding of the stability issue are clearly not aligned. 
Property owners will foremost (as perceived by the officials) be concerned about 
values related to their home, thus using different points of departure for the 
evaluation of the stability issue. Officials on the other hand, will daily encounter 
the risk of landslide in their professional lives, when discussing with colleges and 
when preparing planning documents. 
 
Expert management 
Throughout the risk governance regimes the presence of experts was a striking 
theme and is concurrent with previous research of Swedish risk management 
(Löfstedt, 2005). The fragmented risk governance regime of Göta Älv may be per-
ceived as a network of experts that through negotiations and deliberations estab-
lish practices that are possible to implement. The River Council, which proved to 
be important for flood as well as landslide prevention, is a forum composed of 
experts stretching over several key actors. Networks appear to have bridged insti-
tutional boundaries in several instances in the Göta Älv river valley. However, all 
actors are not included in the expert network that characterizes Göta Älv. Indeed, 
the municipalities’ ability to influence decisions appears to be limited except in 
the landslide case. According to Kelman (1981) Swedish regulation is character-
ized by a tradition of deferent values to elites or experts. This notion may be ap-
plied on the Göta Älv case, where municipalities despite their limited influence on 
the regime expressed ‘accommodationist’ and accepting views towards expert 
policy outcomes.  
Dam risk management is particularly characterised by expert management, na-
tionally as well as in the local context of Göta Älv. The competence gap between 
the public authorities and the dam industry may, however, be seen as a result of 
the partition between the Swedish state and one of its previous functions. Since 
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Vattenfall used to be public, some of the interviewees ascribe a certain moral im-
perative to the company, which may explain why Vattenfall is allowed to largely 
determine dam safety directions without interference. The Maritime Administra-
tion is also included in the dam safety regime, which shares historical ties to Vat-
tenfall. The two actors exemplify a community of practice: even if they no longer 
formally have joint managerial duties, the established practise still remains intact 
and is reinforced by mutual engagement in common projects (Wegner, 1998, 
Wegner et al, 2002).  
 
Experience  
Practical experience may be regarded as highly important to the network of key 
actors.  Experience of slopes and dam material can be seen as prerequisite for the 
trust the actors place in each other’s expert competence. Boholm (2009b) found 
that practical experience of previous events determines outcomes of organisa-
tional action to delimit risk in railway planning. Previous experience functions as 
a catalogue of references to which experts continuously compare new situations, 
experience based knowledge is furthermore seldom contested. The use of experi-
ence in risk management is particularly manifested in the landslide and dam risk 
preventive regime but may also be related to the expert network comprising the 
River Council. Key officials with expert competence derived from experience may 
thus have facilitated decision-making.  
In Göta Älv, the themes of voluntary participation, divisions of responsibility 
and expert knowledge are closely correlated. Due to vague or flexible regulations, 
divisions of responsibility and accountability are negotiated to facilitate agree-
ments.  
 
 
8. Conclusion 
While Hood et al (2001) argues that risk governance regimes must be disaggre-
gated to be understood, the findings of this study points towards the need for 
greater aggregation in order to ‘get the whole picture’. The relationships between 
the actors and the strong linkages between the risk governance regimes in Göta 
Älv would have been hard to detect if the point of the departure had been a par-
ticular risk issue, such as the potential for dam failure. In addition, risk govern-
ance, as a process-based model advocated by Renn (2008), beginning with identi-
fying and setting risk acceptability appear as ill-suited to practical risk manage-
ment, since the risk problem is already embedded in an existing regulatory 
framework, framed by organisational functions and working arrangement having 
a long history. By recommending a standard set of procedures for a certain cate-
gory of risk (Renn, 2008), informal practices crucial for risk management, threat-
ens to be ignored. A too narrow focus on isolated regimes and specific policies 
thus serves to decontextualizes risk governance practices. The interconnectedness 
of the risk governance regimes in Göta Älv makes it pertinent to question whether 
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the regimes are interlinked or in fact nested within an overarching governance 
network, forming through historical interdependences and continuous practice 
regarding physical objects that need to be managed. 
Therefore it is essential to address current practices in addition to formal policy 
requirements. Practices provide the linkages between regimes and may enable 
governance regimes to cohere and consequently bridge administrative and organ-
isational boundaries, despite fragmented regulation and unclear divisions of re-
sponsibility, challenges which have been emphasized as particular important in 
regards to climate change (Betsill and Bulkeley 2007, Naess et al, 2005, Neuval & 
van der Brink, 2009, Storbjörck, 2007). Climate adaptation is moreover likely to be 
based upon already existing risk governance structures. The results in this study 
therefore support the advice by Burton (1997) and Naess et al (2005); an enhanced 
understandings of risk management is needed in order to successfully implement 
adaptive measures rather than to adopt generic risk managerial tools or models 
(EUCOM, 2007; 2009, Renn, 2008) that may dismantle functioning practices. 
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Appendix  
List over respondents 
S1- SGI 
M1- Ale municipality  
M2- Ale municipality  
M3- Trollhättan Municipality  
M4- Lilla Edet Municipality  
C1- Västra Götaland County Board  
C2- Västra Götaland County Board  
C3- Västra Götaland County Board  
MA1- The Swedish Maritime Administration  
MA2- The Swedish Maritime Administration  
SK1 - Svenska Kraftnät  
SK2- Svenska Kraftnät  
V1- Vattenfall 
V2- Vattenfall 
 
